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(a) Manipulated photo (b) Detected manipulations (c) Suggested “undo” (d) Original photo
Figure 1: Given an input face (a), our tool can detect that the face has been warped with the Face-Aware Liquify tool from Photoshop,
predict where the face has been warped (b), and attempt to “undo” the warp (c) and recover the original image (d).
Abstract
Most malicious photo manipulations are created us-
ing standard image editing tools, such as Adobe R©
Photoshop R©. We present a method for detecting one very
popular Photoshop manipulation – image warping applied
to human faces – using a model trained entirely using fake
images that were automatically generated by scripting Pho-
toshop itself. We show that our model outperforms humans
at the task of recognizing manipulated images, can pre-
dict the specific location of edits, and in some cases can
be used to “undo” a manipulation to reconstruct the origi-
nal, unedited image. We demonstrate that the system can be
successfully applied to real, artist-created image manipula-
tions.
1. Introduction
In an era when digitally edited visual content is ubiq-
uitous, the public is justifiably eager to know whether
the images they see on TV, in glossy magazines, and on
the Internet are, in fact, real. While the popular press
∗The code and instructions can be found in our github repository
(https://peterwang512.github.io/FALdetector).
has mostly focused on “DeepFakes” and other GAN-based
methods that may one day be able to convincingly simulate
a real person’s appearance, movements, and facial expres-
sions [35, 10, 7, 17], for now, such methods are prone to
degeneracies and exhibit visible artifacts [25]. Rather, it is
the more subtle image manipulations, performed with clas-
sic image processing techniques, typically in Adobe Photo-
shop, that have been the largest contributors to the prolifera-
tion of manipulated visual content [14]. While such editing
operations have helped enable creative expression, if done
without the viewer’s knowledge, they can have serious neg-
ative implications, ranging from body image issues set by
unrealistic standards, to the consequences of “fake news” in
politics.
In this work, we focus on one specific type of Photo-
shop manipulation – image warping applied to faces. This
is an extremely common task used for “beautification” and
expression editing. Face warping is an interesting problem
as it is a domain that is surprisingly hard for people to de-
tect, but it is commonly used and has wide reaching impli-
cations. We show in a user study that humans have only
53.5% accuracy in identifying such edits (chance is 50%).
We propose a lens through which these subtle edits become
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(a) Real images (b) Manipulated images
Figure 2: Random samples from our training dataset. (a) Real images scraped from Flickr portraits (top) and Open Images [21] (bottom).
(b) Random warps automatically created with Photoshop’s Face-Aware Liquify tool. The differences are very subtle.
visualized, alerting the viewer to the presence of modifi-
cations, as shown on Figure 1. Our proposed approach is
but one tool in a larger toolbox of techniques that together,
could be used to help combat the spread of misinformation,
and its effects.
Our approach consists of a CNN carefully trained to de-
tect facial warping modifications in images. As with any
deep learning method, collecting enough supervised train-
ing data is always a challenge. This is especially true
for forensics applications, since there are no large-scale
datasets of manually created visual fakes. In this work, we
solve this problem by using Photoshop itself to automati-
cally generate realistic-looking fake training data. We first
collect a large dataset of real face images, scraped from dif-
ferent internet sources (Figure 2a). We then directly script
the Face-Aware Liquify tool in Photoshop, which abstracts
facial manipulations into high level semantic operations,
such as “increase nose width” and “decrease eye distance”.
By randomly sampling manipulations in this space (Fig-
ure 2b), we are left with a training set consisting of pairs of
source images and realistic looking warped modifications.
We train both global classification and local warping
field prediction networks on this dataset. In particular,
our local prediction method uses a combination of loss
functions including flow warping prediction, relative warp
preservation, and a pixel-wise reconstruction loss. We
present a number of applications, including a visualiza-
tion overlay to draw attention to modified regions, as in
Fig. 1(b), and un-warping the manipulated image to make
it more like the original, as in Fig. 1(c). Finally, we eval-
uate our approach on a number of test cases, including im-
ages scraped from various sources, as well as with warping
operations performed by other means.
2. Related work
Image forensics, or forgery detection, is an increasingly
important area of research in computer vision. In this sec-
tion, we focus on works that are either trained from large
amounts of data, or directly address the face domain.
Face manipulation Researchers have proposed foren-
sics methods to detect a variety of face manipulations. Zhou
et al. [42] and Roessler et al. [30, 31] propose neural net-
work models to detect face swapping and face reenactment
— manipulations where one face is wholly replaced with
another (perhaps taken from the same subject) after splic-
ing, color matching, and blending. Other work investigates
detecting morphed (interpolated) faces [29] and inconsis-
tencies in lighting from specular highlights on the eye [16].
In contrast, we consider facial warps which undergo sub-
tle geometric deformations, rather than a complete replace-
ment of the face, or the synthesis of new details.
Learning photo forensics The difficulty in obtaining
labeled training data has led researchers to propose a va-
riety of “self-supervised” image forensics approaches that
are trained on automatically-generated fake images. Chen
et al. [11] use a convolutional network to detect median fil-
tering. Zhou et al. [43] propose an object detection model,
specifically using steganalysis features to reduce the influ-
ence of semantics. The model is pretrained on automatically
created synthetic fakes using object segmentations, and sub-
sequently fine-tuned on actual fake images. While we also
generate fakes automatically, we use the tools that a typical
editor would use, allowing us to detect these manipulations
more accurately. A complementary approach is exploring
unsupervised forensics models that learn only from real im-
ages, without explicitly modeling the fake image creation
process. For example, several models have been proposed
to detect spliced images by identifying patches which come
from different camera models [9, 24], by using EXIF meta-
data [15], or by identifying physical inconsistencies [23].
These approaches, however, are designed to detect instances
of the image splicing problem, while we address a more
subtle manipulation — facial structure warping.
Hand-defined manipulation cues Other image foren-
sics work has proposed to detect fake images using hand-
defined cues [14]. Early work detected resampling ar-
tifacts [28, 20] by finding periodic correlations between
nearby pixels. There has also been work that detects in-
consistent quantization [4], double-JPEG artifacts [8, 5],
and geometric inconsistencies [26]. However, the opera-
tions performed by interactive image editing tools are often
complex, and can be difficult to model. Our approach, by
contrast, learns features appropriate for its task from a large
dataset of manipulated images.
Train Val Test
Source OpenImage & Flickr Flickr
Total Images 1.1M 10k 100
Unmanipulated images 157k 5k 50
Manipulated images 942k 5k 50
Manipulations Random FAL Pro Artist
Table 1: Dataset statistics. This includes our own automatically
created data as well as a smaller test set of manipulations created
by a professional artist.
3. Datasets
We obtain a large dataset of real face images from
the Open Images dataset [21] and Flickr, and create two
datasets of fakes: a large, automatically generated set of
manipulated images for training a forensics model, and a
smaller set of actual manipulations done by an artist for
evaluation. Details of the data collection process are pro-
vided in Appendix A5.
Generating manipulated face images Our goal is to
automatically create a dataset of manipulated images that,
when leveraged for training, generalizes to artist-created
fakes. We script the Face-Aware Liquify (FAL) tool [1] in
Adobe Photoshop to generate a variety of face manipula-
tions, using built-in support for JavaScript execution. We
choose Photoshop, since it is one of the most popular im-
age editing tools, and this operation, as it is a very common
manipulation in portrait photography. FAL represents ma-
nipulations using 16 parameters, corresponding to higher-
level semantics (e.g., adjusting the width of the nose, eye
distance, chin height, etc.). A facial landmark detector reg-
isters a mesh to the input image, and the parameters control
the mesh’s vertex displacements. As shown in Figure 1,
the tool can be used to make subtle, realistic manipulations,
such as making a face more symmetrical. We randomly
sample the FAL parameter space. While these parameter
choices are unlikely to match the changes an artist would
make, we argue, and validate, that randomly sampling the
space will cover the space of “realistic” operations. We
modify each image from our real face dataset randomly 6
times. In all, the data we used for training is 1.295M faces
– 185K unmodified, and 1.1M modified. Additionally, we
hold out 5K real faces each from Open Images and Flickr,
leaving half of the images unmodified and the rest modified
in the same way as the training data. In total, the validation
data consists of 2.5K images in each categories – {Open
Images, Flickr} × {unmanipulated, manipulated}. Table 1
summarizes that data and Figure 2 shows random samples.
Test Set: Artist-created face manipulations We test
the generalization ability to “real” manipulations by con-
tracting a professional artist to manipulate 50 real pho-
tographs. Half are manipulated with the intent of “beau-
tifying”, or increasing attractiveness, and the other half to
change facial expression, positively or negatively. This cov-
ers two important use cases. The artist created 50 images
with the FAL tool, and 50 images with the more general
Liquify tool – a free-form brush used to warp images. On
average, it took 7.8 minutes of editing time per image.
4. Methods
Our goal is to train a system to detect facial manipu-
lations. We present two models: a global classification
model, tasked with predicting whether a face has been
warped, and a local warp predictor, which can be used to
identify where manipulations occur, and reverse them.
4.1. Real-or-fake classification
We first address the question “has this image been ma-
nipulated?” We train a binary classifier using a Dilated
Residual Network variant (DRN-C-26) [39]. Details of the
training procedure are provided in Appendix A6.
We investigate the effect of resolution by training low
and high-resolution models. High-resolution models enable
preservation of low-level details, potentially useful for iden-
tifying fakes, such as resampling artifacts. On the other
hand, a lower-resolution model potentially contains suffi-
cient details to identify fakes and can be trained more ef-
ficiently. We try low and high-resolution models, where
the shorter side of the image is resized to 400 and 700 pix-
els, respectively. During training, the images are randomly
left-right flipped and cropped to 384 and 640 pixels, respec-
tively.
While we control the post-processing pipeline in our test
setup, real-world use cases may contain unexpected post-
processing. Forensics algorithms are often sensitive to such
operations [28]. To increase robustness, we consider more
aggressive data augmentation, including resizing methods
(bicubic and bilinear), JPEG compression, brightness, con-
trast, and saturation. We experimentally find that this in-
creases robustness to perturbations at testing, even if they
are not in the augmentation set.
4.2. Predicting what moved where
Upon detecting whether a face has been modified, a nat-
ural question for a viewer is how the image was edited:
which parts of an image were warped, and what did the im-
age look like prior to manipulation? To do this, we predict
an optical flow field Uˆ ∈ RH×W×2 from the original im-
age Xorig ∈ RH×W×3 to the warped image X , which we
then use to try to “reverse” the manipulation and recover the
original image.
We train a flow prediction model F to predict the per-
pixel warping field, measuring its distance to an approxi-
mate “ground-truth” flow field U for each training exam-
ple (computed estimating optical flow between the original
Algorithm Validation (Random FAL) Test (Professional Artist)
Method Resol- with Accuracy AP 2AFC Accuracy AP 2AFC
ution Aug? Total Orig Mod Total Orig Mod
Chance – – 50.0 50.0 50.0 50.0 50.0 50.0 50.0 50.0 50.0 50.0
Human – – – – – – 53.5 – – – – 71.1
FaceForensics++ [31] – – 51.3 86.3 16.2 52.7 – 50.0 85.7 14.3 55.3 61.9
Self-consistency* [15] – – – – – 53.7 – – – – 56.4 72.0
Low-res no aug. 400 97.0 97.2 96.9 99.7 99.5 89.0 86.0 92.0 96.8 98.0
Low-res with aug. 400 X 93.7 91.6 95.7 98.9 98.9 83.0 74.0 92.0 94.4 96.0
High-res with aug. 700 X 97.1 99.8 94.5 99.8 100.0 90.0 96.0 84.0 97.4 98.0
Table 2: Real-or-fake classifier performance. We tested models with FAL warping applied both by automated scripting and a professional
artist. We observe that training with high-resolution inputs performs the best among the three. In addition, training without augmentation
performs better in this domain, but adding augmentation makes the model more robust to corruptions, both within and outside of the
augmentation set (see Appendix A3). *Self-consistency was tested on a 2k random subset of the validation set due to running time
constraints.
and modified images). Fig. 3 shows examples of these flow
fields. To remove erroneous flow values, we discard pixels
that fail a forward-backward consistency test, resulting in
binary mask M ∈ RH×W×1.
Lepe(F) = ||M 
(F(X)− U)||2, (1)
where X is a manipulated image, U is its “ground-truth”
flow,  is the Hadamard product, and Lepe is a measure
of flow error (also known as endpoint error). We compute
this loss for each pixel of the image, and compute the mean.
Following [34], we encourage the flow to be smooth by min-
imizing a multiscale loss on the flow gradients:
Lms(F) =
∑
s∈S
∑
t∈{x,y}
||M  (∇st (F(X))−∇st (U))||2,
(2)
where∇sx,∇sy are horizontal and vertical gradients of a flow
field, decimated by stride s ∈ {2, 8, 32, 64}.
Undoing a warp With the correct flow field predicted
from the original image to the modified image, one can re-
trieve the original image by inverse warping. This leads to
a natural reconstruction loss,
Lrec(F) = ||T
(
X;F(X))−Xorig||1, (3)
where T (X;U) warps X by resampling with flow U . In
this case, the loss is applied to the unwarped image di-
rectly, after warping with a differentiable bilinear interpola-
tion layer. We note that this approach is similar to the main
loss used in flow-based image synthesis models [44, 38].
Applying only the reconstruction loss leads to ambigui-
ties in low-texture regions, which often results in undesir-
able artifacts. Instead, we jointly train with all three losses:
Ltotal = λeLepe + λmLms + λrLrec. We find λe = 1.5,
λm = 15, and λr = 1 work well and perform ablations in
Section 5.2.
Architecture We use a Dilated Residual Network variant
(DRN-C-26) [39], pretrained on the ImageNet [32] dataset,
as our base network for local prediction. The DRN archi-
tecture was designed originally for semantic segmentation,
and we found it to work well for the warp prediction task.
We found that directly training the flow regression net-
work performed poorly. We first recast the problem into
multinomial classification, commonly used in regression
problems (e.g., colorization [22, 40], surface normal pre-
diction [36], and generative modeling [27]), and then fine-
tune with a regression loss. We computed ground truth flow
fields using PWC-Net [33]. Details of the training proce-
dure are provided in Appendix A6.
5. Experiments
We evaluate our ability to detect and undo image manip-
ulations, using both automatic and artist-created images.
5.1. Real-or-fake classification
We first investigate whether manipulated images can be
detected by our global classifier on our validation set. We
test the robustness of the classifier by perturbing the images,
and measure its generalization ability to manipulations by a
professional artist (Table 2).
We evaluate several variants: (1) Low-res with aug.:
a lower-resolution model (400 pixels on the smaller side),
with data augmentation (compression, resizing methods,
and photometric changes) and the whole training set (in-
cluding low-resolution images). (2) Low-res no aug.: We
test the augmentation methods above by omitting them.
Note that all models still include random flipping and crop-
Face-Aware Liquify (FAL) Other Manipulations
Losses Val (Rand-FAL) Artist-FAL Artist-Liquify Portrait-to-Life [6]
EPE Multi- Pix EPE IOU-3 ∆PSNR EPE IOU-3 ∆PSNR EPE IOU-3 ∆PSNR EPE IOU-3 ∆PSNRscale `1 ↓ ↑ ↑ ↓ ↑ ↑ ↓ ↑ ↑ ↓ ↑ ↑
EPE-only X 0.51 0.45 +2.67 0.74 0.33 +2.09 0.63 0.12 -1.21 1.74 0.42 –
MultiG X X 0.53 0.42 +2.38 0.75 0.30 +2.07 0.59 0.11 -0.84 1.75 0.41 –
Full X X X 0.52 0.43 +2.69 0.73 0.28 +2.21 0.56 0.12 -0.72 1.74 0.40 –
Table 3: Warping localization and undoing performance. We show performance of our local prediction models across several evalua-
tions: (1) EPE, which measures average flow accuracy, (2) IOU-3, which measures flow magnitude prediction accuracy and (3) ∆PSNR,
which measures how closely the predicted unwarping recovers the original image from the manipulated; ↑, ↓ indicate if higher or lower is
better. Our full method with all losses (flow prediction, multiscale flow gradient, and pixel-wise reconstruction) performs more strongly
than ablations, both across datasets which use Face-Aware Liquify and other manipulations.
ping. (3) High-res with aug.: We test if training on higher
resolution (700 pixels on shorter side) may allow the net-
work to pick up on more details. We keep the lower resolu-
tion images by upsampling them.
Baselines We compare our approach to several recent
methods, which were trained for other, related forensics
tasks. (1) FaceForensics++ [31]: A network trained on
face swapping and reenactment data; we use the Xcep-
tion [12] model trained on raw video frames. (2) Self-
consistency [15]: A network trained to spot low-level in-
consistencies within an image.
Evaluations First, we evaluate our model’s raw accuracy
on the binary prediction task. Second, we use ranking-based
scores that are not sensitive to the “base rate” of the fraction
of fake images (which may be difficult to know in practice).
For this, we use Average Precision (AP), as well as a Two
Alternative Force Choice (2AFC) score that is directly com-
parable to human studies, where we provide our model with
two images, one real and one manipulated, and measure the
fraction of the time it assigns a higher manipulation proba-
bility to the fake.
Evaluation on auto-generated fakes We first explore
performance on our validation set, shown in Table 2 (left),
containing automatically-generated manipulated images.
We began by running a human studies test on Amazon
Mechanical Turk (AMT). We showed real and manipulated
images, side-by-side for 6 seconds, and ask participants to
identify the one that was modified. We gave 15 example
pairs to “train” each person and then collected 35 test ex-
amples (for 40 participants total). Since the manipulations
we trained with are subtle, this was a challenging task; par-
ticipants were able to identify the manipulated image 53.5%
of the time (chance = 50%). This indicates that it is difficult
to use high-level semantics alone for this task.
The low-res model trained with augmentation performs
at 93.7% accuracy and 98.9% average precision. Without
augmenting for different resampling techniques, our net-
work performance increases to 97.0% accuracy and 99.7%
AP, but leaves the network less robust to different image
creation and editing pipelines. Processing at a higher reso-
lution, 700 pixels, the performance also increases to 97.1%
accuracy and 99.8% AP. Details of robustness experiments
of our models are presented in Appendix A3, along with an
analysis of the Class Activation Maps of the global classifier
in Appendix A2.
Artist test set Critically, we investigate if training on our
random perturbations generalizes to a more real-world set-
ting. We collect data from a professional artist, tasked with
the goal of making a subject more attractive, or changing
the subject’s expression. Since the edits here are made to be
more noticeable, and study participants were able to iden-
tify the modified image with 71.1% accuracy. Our high-res
classifier achieves 98.0% in the 2AFC setting. Our accuracy
drops from 97.1 in the validation setting to 90.0. However,
the AP drops much less, from 99.8 to 97.4. This indicates
that there is some domain gap between our random pertur-
bations and an artist, which can be reduced by a certain ex-
tent by “recalibrating” the classifier’s detection threshold.
Baselines We compare to two recent baselines for image
forensics, FaceForensics++ [31] and Self-consistency [15].
Neither of these methods are designed for our application:
FaceForensics++ is split into three manipulation types: face
swapping, “deepfakes” face replacement, and face2face
reenactment [31]. Self-consistency, on the other hand, is
designed to detect low-level differences in image character-
istics. Both methods perform around chance on our dataset,
indicating that generalizing to facial warping manipulations
is challenging.
However, our method is able to generalize to some of
the FaceForensics++ datasets. The low-res model with aug-
mentation performs significantly better than chance (50.0%
acc; 50.0% AP) on FaceSwap (65.4% acc; 71.8% AP),
Face2Face (69.9% acc; 77.4% AP) and DeepFake (77.2%
acc; 87.1% AP) tasks. On the other hand, the high-res
model doesn’t generalize as well to the task: FaceSwap
(59.4% acc; 64.7% AP), Face2Face (55.7% acc; 55.9%
Input GT flow Our prediction Flow overlay Input GT flow Our prediction Flow overlay
Figure 3: Qualitative results on artist-created and auto-generated data. We show examples of our flow prediction on images ma-
nipulated from an external artist and from our auto-generated validation set. (Input) Input manipulated image. (GT flow) The ”ground
truth” optical flow from original to manipulated image. (Our prediction) Predicted flow from our network. (Flow overlay) Magnitude of
predicted flow overlaid. See Appendix A2 for additional examples.
Manipulated Unwarped Original Manipulated Unwarped Original
Figure 4: Unwarping results. These images show results from the artist edited test dataset, where the manipulations are reversed by our
model. Among other edits, the mouth and nose in the top row were expanded. In the bottom row, the nose shape was made less round and
the eye was shrunk.
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Figure 5: Analysis of a Puppeteered video [6]. A single input
image (first and last frame) is driven by a smiling animation. (top)
Our local analysis correctly identifies manipulated regions (cor-
ners of the mouth). (bottom) The global prediction over time
shows how the animation moves from input to smile and back.
AP) and DeepFake (65.0% acc; 71.3% AP). This indicates
that training with lower resolution images might allow the
model to learn more high-level features (e.g., geometric
inconsistencies), where the features can then be used to
detect other face manipulations, while training with high-
resolution images allows the model to leverage low-level
image features that allow it to perform better within the nar-
rower domain. Moreover, training on synthetically gener-
ated subtle facial warping data could be an interesting tech-
nique to generalize to other, more complex, editing tasks.
5.2. Localizing and undoing manipulations
Next, we evaluate manipulation localization and reversal.
Model variations To help understand what parts of our
model contributed to its performance, we ablate the loss
functions for our local prediction model. Since previous
methods have not considered the problem of predicting or
reversing warps, we consider variations of our own model.
(1) Our full method: trained with endpoint error (EPE)
(Eqn. 1), multiscale gradient (Eqn. 2), and reconstruction
(Eqn. 3) losses. (2) EPE: an ablation only trained with end-
point loss. (3) MultiG: trained with endpoint and multi-
scale, but without reconstruction loss.
Evaluations We evaluate our model in several ways,
capturing both localization ability and warp reversal abil-
ity. (1) End Point Error (EPE) similarity between pre-
dicted and ground-truth flow between the original and ma-
nipulated images (Eqn 1). (2) Intersection Over Union
(IOU-τ ) We apply threshold τ to predicted and ground
truth flows magnitudes and compute IOU. (3) Delta Peak
Signal-to-Noise Ratio (∆PSNR) effectiveness of our pre-
dicted unwarping, PSNR (original, unwarped manipulated)
minus PSNR (original, manipulated)
Analysis As shown in Table 3, we found that removing
a loss reduced performance. In particular, we found that
directly optimizing the reconstruction loss led to better im-
age reconstructions. In Figures 3 and 4, we show several
qualitative results on the automatically-generated and artist-
created data. We include more qualitative results, randomly
sampled from the validation set, in Appendix A2.
5.3. Out-of-distribution manipulations
While our model is trained to detect face warping ma-
nipulations made by Photoshop, we also evaluate its ability
to detect other kinds of image editing, and discuss its limi-
tations.
Puppeteering We conduct an experiment to see whether
our method can be used to detect the results of recent image-
puppeteering work [6]. In this work, a video (from a dif-
ferent subject) is used to animate an input image via im-
age warping and the additional of extra details, such as skin
wrinkles and texture in the eyes and mouth. We apply our
manipulation detection model to this data, and show that de-
spite not being trained on this data, we are still able to make
reasonable predictions. Fig. 5 shows a qualitative result of
running both local and global predictors on this data, where
it correctly identifies a puppeted smile animation that starts
and returns to a (real) rest pose. We observe that our low-
res model with augmentation produces more stable predic-
tions over time than the one trained without augmentation.
Moreover, the high-res model doesn’t generalize to detect-
ing such manipulations. We note that PSNR comparisons
on this data are not possible, due to the addition of non-
warping image details.
Global Local
Accuracy AP ∆PSNR EPE
High-res with aug. 55.0 64.0 – –
Low-res no aug. 57.0 67.7 +0.15 0.99
Low-res with aug. 67.0 79.6 +0.61 0.91
Table 4: Results on Facebook post-processing. We tested our
global and local models with the artist test set and compare the
performance of our different models.
Social media post-processing pipeline We also evalu-
ated our model’s robustness to post-processing operations
performed by Facebook (e.g., extra JPEG compression).
We uploaded our artist-created fakes to Facebook, and then
evaluated our method with the post-processed images. Ta-
ble 4 shows results of our low-res models trained with and
without augmentation, along with the high-res global clas-
sifier. We note that the high-res model doesn’t generalize
to such scenario, and both global and local models trained
with augmentation perform better in this scenario.
Other image editing tools We also tested our lo-
cal detection model on facial warping by Facetune [2]
Lens Studio Facetune Facetune (airbrushed)
Figure 6: Unwarping with other image editing tools. We show
results of unwarping predictions from Snapchat Lens Studio and
Facetune edits. From top to bottom is: (1) Manipulated input. (2)
Suggested ”undo”. (3) Original image. (4) Heatmap overlay.
and Snapchat Lens Studio [3]. Facetune provides similar
warping operations to change a person’s expression along
with an airbrushing functionality, and Snapchat Lens Stu-
dio warps the face by magnifying certain parts of a face.
Fig. 6 shows a qualitative result of suggested undo predic-
tions. Notice that our model is able to perform reasonable
recovery of the edits even if the model is not trained on these
tools.
Generic Liquify filter Like any data-driven method, we
are limited by our training distribution. Warping edits that
exist outside of this, such as warping applied to hair or body,
cannot be detected by our method. This can be seen in
our artist experiment with the generic (non-face) Liquify
filter, where images are sometimes outside the distribution
(Figure 7). Despite this, our method can still predict with
success well above chance (64.0 accuracy, 85.6 AP), in-
dicating some generalization. However, the global classi-
fier performs well below the FAL operation (90.0 accuracy,
97.4 AP), and the local prediction accuracy is not enough
to improve the PSNR when unwarping (-0.72 ∆PSNR). In-
creasing the range of scripted warping operations is likely
GT edits Predicted edits Unwarped diff
Figure 7: Limitations. When manipulations are too far outside the
training distribution, as with the general Liquify tool experiment.
Our local prediction model fails to correctly identify warped re-
gions. This is visible in the overlay as well as in the unwarped
image (difference to ground truth after unwarping is shown on the
right, darker is worse).
to improve this. In general, reversing the warps is a chal-
lenging problem, as there are many configurations of plau-
sible faces. This can be seen in that the PSNR improvement
we get on the artist test set is limited to +2.21 db on av-
erage. While this manipulation is reduced, the problem of
perfectly restoring the original image remains an open chal-
lenge.
6. Conclusion
We have presented the first method designed to detect fa-
cial warping manipulations, and did so using by training a
forensics model entirely with images automatically gener-
ated from an image editing tool. We showed that our model
can outperform human judgments in determining whether
images are manipulated, and in many cases is able to pre-
dict the local deformation field used to generate the warped
images. We see facial warp detection as an important step
toward making forensics methods for analyzing images of
a human body, and extending these approaches to body ma-
nipulations and photometric edits such as skin smoothing
are interesting avenues for future work. Moreover, we also
see our work as being a step toward toward making foren-
sics tools that learn without labeled data, and which incor-
porate interactive editing tools into the training process.
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Appendix
A1. Supplemental Video
We have included a supplementary video in the follow-
ing link: https://youtu.be/TUootD36Xm0. We invite read-
ers to view this video for better visualizations of our quali-
tative results.
A2. Qualitative results
Local predictions Figure A5 shows a random selec-
tion of results from our validation dataset of automatically-
generated manipulations. We conducted an experiment
where the PSNR change with respect to scaled versions of
the predicted flow field are shown over the validation set
(Figure A1). We can see that the highest PSNR gain is
where the scale factor is 1.0, which implies that our pre-
dicted flow fields do not contain a multiplicative bias, that
might result from the regression loss.
Network visualization We visualize our global classifier
using the class activation map method of Zhou et al. [41].
Figures A6, A7 show a random selection of class activation
maps of our global classifier. Note that our global classifier
model is able to achieve high accuracy (93.7%) despite the
mismatch between class activation maps and ground truth
flow. This suggests that the model may be able to pick up
other cues to differentiate between original and manipulated
images.
A3. Robustness to corruptions
We tested the robustness of our model by perturbing the
low-level statistics of our validation set through common
corruptions such as lossy JPEG compression, blurring, and
printing and scanning physical prints. This offers three in-
teresting test cases, as we did train on JPEG compressed
images, did not train on blurring, and cannot train on res-
canned images due to the cost of dataset acquisition.
As shown in Fig. A2, the method with augmentation
is fairly robust to JPEG compression. Though we did not
train with blurring augmentations (as images are unlikely to
be intentionally blurred), training with other augmentations
helps increase resilience. However, with significant blur
(σ > 4), performance degrades to chance levels. This in-
dicates that the classifier is relying on some high frequency
information, which is the main component attenuated by the
Gaussian filter.
Lastly, we also test the robustness of our classifier to
print rebroadcasting [13], testing on images that are printed,
and then re-digitized by a scanner (e.g., simulating the
task of identifying manipulations in magazine covers). We
used a Canon imageRunner Advance C3530i Multifunc-
tional copier and standard 8.5×11 inch paper. We ran-
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Figure A1: PSNR plots from our held-out validation subset. We
plot the average PSNRs of the unwarped image to the original (y-
axis), with respect to a multiplicative factor on the predicted flow
field. The error bars are the standard errors. In the ideal case, this
PSNR should peak at 1.0, the predicted flow.
domly selected 30 images each from the Flickr and Open-
Images sets. Classification performance drops from 94.2%
to 69.2% (standard error of 6.0%). While rebroadcasting
hurts performance, our model still detects manipulated im-
ages significantly more accurately than chance.
Global Local
Acc. AP ∆PSNR IOU-3
Face / FAL 93.7 98.9 +2.69 0.43
Face / X2face 64.7 74.0 +0.13 0.05
Noise / FAL 44.5 92.9 – 0.43
Noise / X2face 36.5 82.0 – 0.03
Natural / FAL 67.7 77.3 +0.12 0.05
Table 5: Generalization results. We tested the generalization of
our global and local models on four out-of-distribution dataset.
The top row (Face/FAL) contains the results of our original vali-
dation set for comparison.
A4. Generalization
We are interested in what cues in the images the model
learns to focus on, in order to detect warping. For exam-
ple, is the model looking at low-level image statistics (e.g.
resampling artifacts) or high-level cues (e.g. facial geomet-
ric inconsistencies)? This has larger implications for ex-
ample in whether the model can detect warps only realiz-
able by FAL, or can it detect more general warping sce-
narios? To investigate, we evaluate our global and local
models in four different scenarios: (1) images composed
of noise, warped with FAL warps, (2) images composed of
noise warped with out-of-domain warps, (3) out-of-domain
natural images warped with FAL warps, and (4) portrait im-
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Figure A2: Robustness to corruptions. Accuracy of global classification with JPEG, Gaussian blur, and after rescanning, with and without
data augmentation. (left) JPEG compression: a significant increase in robustness. Though unsurprising, as it is in our augmentation set, it
is important, as compression and recompression is commonly applied to images. (middle) Blur: although this is not in our augmentation
set, we observe a small increase in robustness. (right) Rescanning: a small increase in robustness. We corrupt by printing and rescanning a
subset of photos, a perturbation that cannot be reproduced during training
ages warped with out-of-domain warps.
To generate out-of-domain warps, we randomly sampled
the latent space of the optical flow generator in the X2face
model [37] to generate warps. We note that although the
X2face model is trained to generate face-specific warps, the
warping field will not necessarily align with the portrait;
moreover, since a VAE loss is not included during X2face
training, sampling the bottleneck does not guarantee to have
realistic warping fields. However, empirically we observed
our sampling method generates smooth warping fields that
modifies the face in a “stochastic” fashion. That is, the
X2face warping field will not specifically change a face in a
meaningful way such as making someone’s smile bigger or
face smaller. On the other hand, for out-of-domain images
we collected natural images from random samples in Open
Images [21], which are not portrait images. Table 5 shows
the results.
Note that when there is a domain shift in warping field
(face/X2face) or image space (natural/FAL), the perfor-
mances of both models drop significantly although still per-
form above chance (50% Accuracy and 0 ∆PSNR). More
interestingly, note that our global model is able to general-
ize to warped noise with FAL and X2face flows at a cer-
tain degree if well-calibrated (92.9, 82.0 AP), and our local
model generalizes specifically to FAL-warped noise. This
indicates they have learned low-level warping cues, while
the local model is more specific to FAL warping field statis-
tics. However, we trained global and local models solely on
noise warped with FAL flows and tested on our validation
set, and the models are only able to achieve 49.6% accuracy
and 28.28 EPE respectively. This suggests that our model
has learned low-level cues, but that low-level cues are not
sufficient: the face warping problem is much more difficult.
A5. Additional data collection details
Figure A4 shows a sample of the manipulations in our
automatically-generated dataset. For each example photo,
Figure A3: Noise experiment setup. The Gaussian noise image
(left) and the face image (middle) are deformed with the same
warping field (right). Our model trained on faces can detect the
warped noise (if well-calibrated), but a model trained on noise can-
not detect the warped face.
we show all 6 random manipulations that were applied to it.
Collecting real face images To obtain a diverse dataset
of faces, we aggregate images from a variety of sources.
First, we take all images from the Open Images dataset [21]
with the “human face” label. This dataset consists of hu-
mans in-the-wild, scraped from Flickr. We also scrape
Flickr specifically for portrait photography images. To iso-
late the faces, we use an out-of-the-box CNN-based face
detector from dlib [18] and crop the face region only. All
together, our face dataset contains 69k and 116k faces
from OpenImages and Flickr portrait photos, respectively,
of which approximately 65k are high-resolution (at least
700 pixels on the shortest side). We note that the our
dataset is biased toward Flickr users, who, on average, post
higher-quality photographs than users of other Internet plat-
forms. More problematically, the Flickr user base is pre-
dominantly Western. However, as our method is entirely
self-supervised, it is easy to collect and train with new data
to match the test distribution for a target application.
A6. Implementation and training details
Flow consistency mask Given the original image Xorig
and manipulated image Xmod, we compute the flow from
original to manipulated and from manipulated to original
using PWC-Net [33], which we denote Uom and Umo, re-
spectively.
To compute the flow consistency mask, we transform
Umo from the manipulated image space into the original
image space, which is U ′mo = T
(
Umo; Uom
)
. We con-
sider the flow to be consistent at a pixel if the magnitude of
U ′mo + Uom is less than a threshold. After this test, pixels
corresponding to occlusions and ambiguities (e.g., in low-
texture regions) will be marked as inconsistent, and there-
fore do not contribute to the loss.
We take relative error of the flow consistency as the cri-
terion. For a pixel p,
Minconsistent(p) = 1
{ ||U ′mo(p) + Uom(p)||2
||Uom(p)||2 +  > τ
}
. (4)
We take  = 0.1 and τ = 0.85, then apply a Gaussian
blur with σ = 7, denoted by G, and take the complement to
get the flow consistency mask M :
M = 1−G(Minconsistent) (5)
Training details for local prediction networks We use
a two-stage training curriculum, where we first train a per-
pixel 121-class classifier to predict the discretized warping
field. We round the flow values into the closest integer, and
assign class to each integer (u, v) value with a cutoff at 5
pixels. Therefore, we have u, v ∈ {−5,−4, . . . , 4, 5}, i.e.
121 classes in total. We pretrained the model for 100k itera-
tions with batch size 16. Our strategy is consistent to Zhang
et al. [40], which found that (in the context of coloriza-
tion) pretraining with multinomial classification and then
fine-tuning for regression gave better performance than just
training for regression directly.
The base-network of the regression model is initialized
with the pretrained model weights, and the other weights
are initialized with normal distribution with gain 0.02. We
train the models for 250k iterations with batch size 32.
Both models are trained with Adam optimizer [19] with
learning rate 10−4, β1 = 0.9, β2 = 0.999.
Training details for global classification networks We
initialized the base-network of the DRN-C-26 [39] network
with the weights pretrained on the local detection task, and
fine-tuned it for the global classification task. We use the
Adam optimizer [19] with β1 = 0.9, β2 = 0.999, mini-
batch size 32 and 16 for the low and high-res models, re-
spectively, and initial learning rate 10−4, reduced by 10×
when loss plateaus. The models are trained for 300k iter-
ations on 135.4k original images and 812.4k modified im-
ages, where the original images are sampled 6× more fre-
quently to balance the class distribution.
Input Manipulations
Figure A4: A random sample of manipulations from our dataset. For each photo, we show all 6 random edits that we made. We note that
many of these modifications are subtle.
Original Manipulated Unwarped Ground truth flow Our flow Manipulated diff. Unwarped diff.
Figure A5: Randomly selected results from our held-out validation dataset, showing the original, warped, and unwarped images. The
ground-truth and predicted flow fields, and the difference images between the manipulated and original image, and the unwarped and
original images (enhanced for visibility).
Class activation map Predicted flow Ground truth flow Class activation map Predicted flow Ground truth flow
Figure A6: Class activation maps on modified images. Numbers on the upper-left corners of the class activation maps are the modification
probability assigned by our model. For reference, we also include the ground truth flow, and our prediction of it.
True negative True negative True negative True negative True negative False positive
Figure A7: Class activation maps on randomly sampled original (unmodified) images. Numbers on the upper-left corners of the class
activation maps are the modification probability assigned by our model.
